How Collaboration Between Industry, the NCSC and the FCA Is Strengthening Cyber Resilience
By ICCSO News Desk
2026-10-27T13:40:36.819Z
A coordinated effort between UK industry, the National Cyber Security Centre and the Financial Conduct Authority has demonstrated the practical value of regulator-led collaboration in improving how organisations share cyber threat information whilst protecting market integrity. The initiative highlights a growing recognition that effective cyber resilience cannot be achieved in isolation. When industry bodies, technical authorities and financial regulators work together, organisations gain clearer guidance on how to exchange sensitive threat intelligence without inadvertently breaching regulatory obligations — a tension that has historically discouraged information sharing across the financial sector.
What Happened and Why It Matters A collaborative initiative involving UK industry, the National Cyber Security Centre and the Financial Conduct Authority has produced practical outcomes aimed at resolving one of the more persistent tensions in financial sector cybersecurity: how can organisations share threat intelligence freely when doing so risks touching on market-sensitive information? The partnership represents a meaningful step forward in translating regulatory goodwill into actionable guidance. For years, security teams in financial services have operated under an uncomfortable uncertainty — the instinct to share indicators of compromise or threat actor tactics with peers is sound, but the fear of inadvertently disclosing price-sensitive or otherwise regulated information has acted as a brake on that openness. Who Is Affected The initiative is primarily relevant to organisations operating within the UK financial sector, where both cybersecurity obligations and financial regulation intersect most sharply. This includes banks, insurers, asset managers, payment service providers and other FCA-regulated entities. However, the lessons drawn from this collaboration carry relevance for any sector where regulatory oversight and cyber threat intelligence sharing coexist — including energy, telecoms and critical national infrastructure. Organisations of all sizes stand to benefit. Smaller regulated firms often lack the legal and compliance resource to independently navigate the boundaries between cybersecurity information sharing and regulatory risk, making authoritative joint guidance from the NCSC and the FCA particularly valuable. The Core Challenge: Information Sharing vs Market Integrity Cyber threat intelligence sharing is widely accepted as one of the most effective ways to raise collective defences. When one organisation detects a novel attack technique, a new phishing campaign or a previously unseen piece of malware, sharing that information rapidly with peers can prevent the same threat from succeeding elsewhere. The financial sector, given its interconnected nature and the systemic risk posed by large-scale cyber incidents, has a particularly strong incentive to do this well. The difficulty arises because financial markets are tightly regulated. Information that touches on an organisation's operational status, vulnerabilities or incident response activity could, in certain circumstances, constitute market-sensitive data. Security professionals have therefore faced a genuine dilemma: share threat data promptly and risk regulatory exposure, or hold back and risk their peers being compromised by the same threat actor. How the Collaboration Worked The NCSC and the FCA engaged directly with industry to understand where this friction was most acutely felt and what practical changes would have the greatest impact. Rather than producing high-level principles that left interpretation to individual legal teams, the aim was to produce clarity that could be applied on the ground by security operations and compliance functions alike. This kind of tripartite engagement — technical authority, financial regulator and industry practitioners working together — is not straightforward to convene. It requires each party to move beyond their own institutional perspective and engage seriously with the constraints and priorities of the others. The fact that it has produced practical outcomes is itself a signal worth noting. Attribution and Threat Actor Context The source material does not detail specific threat actors or attack campaigns that prompted this initiative. However, the broader context is well established: the UK financial sector faces a sustained and sophisticated threat from a range of adversaries, including state-affiliated groups, organised cybercriminal networks and ransomware operators. The systemic importance of financial infrastructure means that threat actors regularly target it, and the interconnected nature of the sector means that a successful attack on one institution can have cascading consequences for others. It is within this environment that the reluctance to share threat intelligence carries real cost. Every delay in circulating an indicator of compromise is a window of opportunity for an adversary to move laterally across the sector. What the NCSC and FCA Are Recommending The collaboration is oriented towards enabling organisations to share cyber threat information with greater confidence. The practical implication is that regulated firms should feel more empowered to participate in intelligence sharing arrangements — whether through formal sector bodies, the NCSC's own sharing platforms, or peer-to-peer engagement — without defaulting to legal caution as the primary response to every sharing decision. Organisations are encouraged to engage with the guidance that has emerged from this process and to use it to update their internal policies on threat intelligence sharing. Security teams should work alongside compliance and legal colleagues to ensure that the distinctions drawn by the regulators are reflected in operational procedures, rather than leaving those decisions to be made reactively in the middle of an incident. Regulatory and Compliance Implications for UK Organisations For UK organisations, the regulatory landscape around cyber incident management is evolving rapidly. The Network and Information Systems regulations — and their ongoing development in line with broader European direction — place obligations on operators of essential services to report significant incidents to their relevant competent authority. The FCA has its own notification requirements for regulated firms, and the Information Commissioner's Office expects timely reporting of personal data breaches under UK GDPR. One of the more complex practical challenges is that these obligations can pull in different directions during an active incident. Sharing threat intelligence with peers, reporting to the NCSC, notifying the FCA and managing a potential ICO disclosure all need to happen in a coordinated way, often under significant time pressure. Clear prior guidance on the boundaries of each obligation reduces the risk of paralysis or error in those moments. The Digital Operational Resilience Act, which applies to financial entities operating within the European Union, adds a further layer of complexity for firms with cross-border operations. While DORA does not directly bind UK-only entities, firms operating across both jurisdictions will need to manage alignment between the DORA framework and UK regulatory expectations. The Current State of Mitigations No specific technical mitigations or vendor patches are associated with this initiative, as it addresses a governance and regulatory challenge rather than a specific technical vulnerability. The mitigation is structural: clearer guidance, better-defined boundaries and more confident participation in threat intelligence sharing arrangements. Organisations that have not yet engaged with formal cyber threat intelligence sharing communities should treat this as a prompt to do so. Sector-specific Information Sharing and Analysis Centres, the NCSC's Cyber Security Information Sharing Partnership and bilateral arrangements with trusted peers all offer routes to participate. The barrier of regulatory uncertainty, which this collaboration has worked to lower, should no longer be cited as a reason to remain outside those communities. For security leaders, the immediate action is to review current information sharing policies in light of any updated guidance, ensure legal and compliance teams are aligned with the spirit as well as the letter of the regulators' intent, and consider whether the organisation's incident response procedures adequately account for the coordination between cyber notification obligations and threat intelligence sharing.